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Since at least the 1930’s economists have puzzled over how to delineate the boundaries of the 
firm.  With the advent of antitrust legislation in 1890, courts have been pressed to consider what 
constitute conspiracies between corporate entities to restrain commerce.  By the 1940’s, courts 
started to characterize conspiracies by sorting out what they are not – specifically, by extending 
the status of “single entity” to certain types of business arrangements.  Both efforts in economics 
and in the law to sort out what constitutes a “firm” or “single entity” have focused on “control.”  
A difficulty is that neither the law nor economics offer an operationally significant concept of 
control.  Even so, both law and economics contribute concepts other than control that provide a 
way of understanding economic organization.  These concepts – control rights, adaptation, 
delegation, and renegotiation – suggests how one can subsume the sometimes confusing array of 




 0. Introduction 
 
In its majority opinion in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. (1984) 467 U.S. 752, 
the Supreme Court “held that a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary were not 
legally capable of conspiring with each other under section 1 of the Sherman Act.”  The principal 
objective of this opinion and of succeeding case law was to restrict prospective litigants from 
imposing demands on the courts to entertain the prospect that any combination of a corporate 
parent and its wholly-owned subsidiaries could constitute an antitrust conspiracy (Areeda 1983, 
pp. 451-452; Belsley 1996, pp. 726-727).  Copperweld and the case law following it intendedly 
neutralized “plaintiffs’ tantalizing, if unpredictable, opportunities to paint contacts among 
[commonly owned] corporations as antitrust conspiracies.” (Areeda 1983, pg. 451)  But that is 
just preamble to the larger question the single entity case law poses: Copperweld and succeeding 
case law may have identified objective criteria for relieving certain types of governance 
structures from scrutiny, but can one identify other objective criteria for identifying other 
structures to which the law might yet extend single entity status? 
 
Copperweld and succeeding case law achieve its objective by defining the combination of a 
parent company and its wholly-owned subsidiaries as a “single entity.”  Defining any one type of 
corporate structure as a single entity relieves it from scrutiny, because one needs more than one 
distinct entity to allege a conspiracy.
1  A difficulty, however, is that one can define anything as a 
single entity.  Definition of itself means nothing without imposing more structure.  One could, 
for example, define a cartel of otherwise competing corporate entities as a single entity and, in 
turn, extend to it the legal protections that status as a single entity implies.  It is no surprise, then, 
that Copperweld and the larger body of “single entity” case law encompassing it have been 
occupied with imposing more structure – that is, with trying to operationalize a concept of a 
“single entity” that discriminates between conspiracies and agglomerations of entities joined in 
“legitimate business arrangements” (Prell 1986, pg. 1157).  Suppose, for example, some number 
of (possibly competing) firms formally incorporate a new entity, share ownership of the new 
entity and collectively participate in the governance of the new entity.  Would the agglomeration 
of the new entity and the firms owning it constitute a “legitimate business arrangement” to which 
the law might extend single entity status? 
 
The most important efforts in the case law to impose structure on such questions have involved 
appealing to “ownership and control” in organizations.
2  The case law is not explicit about how 
ownership and control are related, but it is intuitively appealing to suggest that ownership 
                                                 
1 Single entity status does not insulate parties from all antitrust scrutiny, because Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
makes allowances for the prospect that a single entity might attempt to secure monopoly (Chicago Professional 
Sports LP v. National Basketball Association [1996] 95 F.3d 593 at 599; Kaiser [2004], pg. 17).  The Copperweld 
court itself observed that “The conduct of a single firm is governed by § 2 alone and is unlawful only when it 
threatens actual monopolization” (pg. 767).  Plaintiffs advanced Section 2 monopolization claims in Iain Fraser et 
al. v. Major League Soccer, LLC et al. (2002) 284 F.3d 47. 
2 See, for example, Fouad N. Dagher et al. v. SRI et al. (2004) 369 F.3d 1108 at 1118, HealthAmerica Pennsylvania 
Inc. et al. v. Susquehanna Health System et al. (2003) 278 F.Supp.2d 423 at 428, City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. 
Associated Electric Cooperative (1988) 838 F.2d 268 at 276, James M. Thomsen et al. v. Western Electric Co. et al. 
(1981) 512 F.Supp. 128 at 133, Murphy Tugboat Company v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat (1979) 467 F.Supp. 
841 at 859-60, Douglas K. Knutson et al. v. The Daily Review Inc. (1977) 548 F.2d 795 at 801, and Timken Roller 
Bearing v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 593 at 598.        
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implies control.  It is also intuitively appealing to suggest that a defining characteristic of a single 
entity is that control is concentrated in the hands of a single party.  That yet leaves open the 
question of extending single entity status to business arrangements that feature less than 
completely concentrated control.  Either way, a problem is that the law does not have a crisp 
concept of “control” – or “authority,” “fiat,” or “power” – to begin with.  Surprisingly, neither 
does economics (Demsetz 1995, pp. 35-39; Alchian and Demsetz 1972, pg. 777) nor 
organization theory (Williamson 1995, pg. 235).  Even so, I am able to make discrete 
contributions in this paper that suggest how aspects of control inform analysis of the single entity 
question.  I preview results here: 
 
(1)  Economic theory can inform analysis of the single entity question by shifting the focus 
from “control” to a less demanding concept of “control rights” (Hart 1995, pg. 30 and 
Kreps 1999, pg. 123).  The appeal to control rights provides a way of understanding how 
“ownership” and “control” are related and lends itself to simple, objective criteria for 
identifying “independent centers of decision-making” (Copperweld, pg. 768) within the 
candidate single entity.  A finding that a governance structure features more than one 
distinct center of decision-making frustrates the appeal to the single entity defense. 
 
(2)  If one takes a thirty-thousand foot view of the case law, one can distinguish a few robust 
ideas in it about what constitutes a single entity.  The case law features an array of single 
entity tests.  Many of these tests have prompted much confusion.  It turns out, however, 
that one can subsume many of these tests in a two-stage sequence of tests and can dismiss 
the others.  (See Figure 1.)  The first stage, labeled here a test of “economic unity,”
3 
inquires whether or not ownership, the control rights ownership implies, and remaining 
control rights (if any) are concentrated within the candidate single entity.  Evidence that 
control rights are concentrated might allow a court to stop analysis and accept a single 
entity defense.  In contrast, evidence that control rights are fragmented and are distributed 
across the parties that constitute the candidate single entity complicates appeals to the 
single entity defense.  When analyzing governance structures that fail a strict test of 
economic unity, the law might proceed to a second stage “actual or potential competitors” 
test (Mt. Pleasant at 276).  The test amounts to a test of complementarity in that it sorts out 
whether or not the parties that comprise the candidate single entity contribute 
complementary assets, complementary capabilities or other complementary inputs.  
Applying the test amounts to a de facto rule-of-reason analysis that starts with the question 
of whether or not restraints instituted within the governance of the candidate single entity 
are horizontal or vertical.  A finding that restraints are horizontal is tantamount to a finding 
that parties are not contributing complementary inputs and that the parties are “actual or 
potential competitors.”  Such a finding frustrates the appeal to the single entity defense. 
 
Note the heavy lifting the two-stage sequence of tests does.  It constitutes a simple roadmap that 
one can use to navigate what has been a confusing tangle of ideas and instructions in the case 
law.  Note, also, the heavy lifting the “economic unity test” does.  It provides a rationale for 
foregoing the more costly, time-consuming analysis of the merits and demerits of a governance 
                                                 
3 Arleen Freeman et al. v. San Diego Association of Realtors (2003) 322 F.3d 1133 at 1148        
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structure that something like a full-blown rule-of-reason analysis would demand.
4  Let me also 
suggest that the appeal to “control rights” does much heavy lifting.  It provides criteria that 
operationalize the first-stage test of economic unity.  The criteria allow one to identify whole 
classes of governance structures – joint ventures, long-term contracts, and “strategic alliances” – 
that fail the test of economic unity.   
   
Finally, let me note that the appeal to “control rights” may not resolve all questions of “economic 
unity.”  Ideally, the appeal to control rights would identify all governance structures that fail tests 
of economic unity, leaving one with the powerful proposition that all remaining governance 
structures satisfy tests of economic unity and, accordingly, are single entities.  A difficulty is that 
it is not obvious that all remaining governance structures would satisfy tests of economic unity.  
It might be the case, for example, that centers of decision-making overlap.  One can imagine that 
some parties to a candidate single entity might each reserve control rights with respect to distinct 
decision-making processes, but some other party might maintain control rights that impinge all 
decision-making processes.  Does the fact that one party has a hand in all decision-making 
processes suggest that the candidate single entity maintains only one “center of decision-
making,” or does the fact that different (albeit overlapping) nexuses of parties maintain control 
rights imply that that the candidate single entity maintains more than one “center of decision-
making?”  No obvious answer present itself without imposing even more structure on the 
question of what constitutes “control” in organizations. 
 
How one might impose more structure on characterizing control in organizations is not obvious.  
As the court in Fraser v. Major League Soccer (2002) observed, “Once one goes beyond the 
classic single enterprise, including Copperweld situations, it is difficult to find an easy stopping 
point or even decide on the proper functional criteria for hybrid cases.” (pg. 59)  The appeal to 
control rights does provide operational criteria for hybrid cases – criteria that are easy to 
operationalize.  Specifically, it provides ways to operationalize benchmarks against which 
degrees of control can be measured.  But benchmarks are not silver bullets.  Were degrees of 
control not an issue, one would not need to appeal to more than one benchmark.  Rather, a 
multiplicity of benchmarks reflects the fact that degrees of control is an important, albeit 
inconvenient, aspect of the single entity question.  Not being able to knock down questions of 
control with silver bullets leaves open the prospect of putting tests of economic unity aside and 
moving to a rule-of-reason analyses – de facto or de jure – of the efficiency-enhancing features 
of governance structures that feature less than completely concentrated control.  That, in turn, 
leads to the prospect of putting the entire single entity question aside and proceeding simply to 
the de jure rule of reason analysis. 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds in five parts.  The first part sets up the context out of which 
the single entity question emerged.  The second part frames the paradigm question.  To fix ideas, 
I present four Governance Scenarios, and I refer back to these scenarios at various parts of the 
                                                 
4 The Court of Appeals in Iain Fraser et al. v. Major League Soccer, LLC et al. (2002) 284 F.3d 47 is on point: 
“One would expand upon Copperweld to develop functional tests or criteria for shielding (or refusing to shield) 
[hybrid governance structures] from section 1 scrutiny for intra-enterprise arrangements.   This would be a complex 
task and add a new layer of analysis; but where the analysis shielded the arrangement it would serve to cut off 
similarly difficult, intrusive scrutiny of such intra enterprise activities under extremely generalized rule-of-reason 
standards.” (pg. 58)        
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paper.  The third part develops the concept of “control rights” and suggests how it can inform the 
concept of “economic unity.”  The fourth part presents the two-stage sequence of tests featured 
in the case law, and the fifth part applies the logic of the single entity tests to a selection of cases.  
These cases illustrate the power of the tests and illuminate pitfalls into which courts have 
sometimes fallen.  The last part concludes. 
 
 
1.  Whence the Single Entity Defense in Antitrust? 
 
A sequence of Supreme Court opinions and lower court opinions between 1941 and 1951 
established the idea that commonly owned or controlled entities could conspire in ways 
cognizable under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  One of the earlier and “talismanic”
5 citations on 
this count comes from United States v. Yellow Cab (1947) 332 US 218 at 228: “[A] restraint [on 
interstate commerce] may result as readily from a conspiracy among those who are affiliated or 
integrated under common ownership as from a conspiracy among those who are otherwise 
independent.  Similarly, any affiliation or integration flowing from an illegal conspiracy cannot 
insulate the conspirators from the sanctions which Congress has imposed.  The corporate 
interrelationships of the conspirators, in other words, are not determinative of the applicability of 
the Sherman Act. That statute is aimed at substance rather than form.”  In United States v. 
General Motors (1941) 121 F.2d 376, General Motors attempted during the course of litigation 
to anticipate and neutralize reasoning of the sort applied in Yellow Cab.  General Motors 
complained that jurors should have been instructed that “if they find that the defendant 
corporations [various General Motors subsidiaries] together constitute a single co-operative 
enterprise, in the course of which defendants corporations do not compete with one another, that 
there is and can be no unlawful agreement among them to restrain trade and commerce among 
the states, in automobiles” (pg. 409).  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, indicating 
that “It has been shown as a matter of law that the appellants [the General Motors entities] are 
separate entities, even though as a matter of economics they may constitute a single integrated 
enterprise, and that they are not impotent to restrain the trade and commerce of the dealers in 
General Motors cars.  Consequently, the Court was not obliged to give such an instruction [to 
jurors].” 
 
Building explicitly on Yellow Cab, the court in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram and 
Sons (1951) 340 US 211 observed that even if commonly owned or controlled units of a firm 
may constitute “mere instrumentalities of a single manufacturing merchandising unit … common 
ownership and control does not liberate corporations from the impact of the antitrust laws” (pg. 
261).  Echoing its ruling in Kiefer-Stewart, the court in Timken Roller Bearing v. United States 
(1951) 341 U.S. 593 indicated that “The fact that there is common ownership or control of … 
contracting corporations does not liberate them from the impact of the antitrust laws” (pg. 598).  
Building, in turn, on Kiefer-Stewart, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Joseph E. Seagram 
and Sons et al. v. Hawaiian Oke and Liquors (1969) 416 F.2d 71 explicitly identified a tension in 
the case law when it observed that “It is now settled law that if a corporation chooses to conduct 
parts of its business through subsidiary or affiliated corporations, and conspires with them to do 
something that independent entities cannot conspire to do under section 1 of the Sherman Act, it 
is no defense that the corporations are, in reality a single economic entity.  The Supreme Court 
                                                 
5 Areeda (1983) pg. 458        
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has said that ‘common ownership and control does not liberate corporations from the impact of 
the antitrust laws.’ …  [Yet] [t]he Court has never indicated what, if any, are the limits of this 
[intracorporate conspiracy] doctrine” (pg. 82)  The Copperweld court severely circumscribed 
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine when it held that “[defendants] Copperweld and its wholly 
owned subsidiary Regal are incapable of conspiring with each other for purposes of § 1 of the 
Sherman Act. To the extent that prior decisions of this Court are to the contrary, they are 
disapproved and overruled” (pg. 777). 
 
 
2.  The Single Entity Question 
 
Copperweld did not so much dismiss intracorporate conspiracy doctrine
6 as take certain types of 
objectively identifiable “business arrangements” off the table.  Copperweld expressly limited its 
inquiry to the “narrow issue” of “whether a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are capable 
of conspiring in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act” (Copperweld, pg. 767).  It explicitly left 
open for further consideration other types of business arrangements such as those under which “a 
parent may be liable for conspiring with an affiliated corporation it does not completely own.”  It 
then went on to suggest a number of formative single entity tests, the most important of which 
depend on ownership and control. 
 
The suggestion in Copperweld and in the entire body of single entity case law is plain: 
“ownership” and “control” are related, and both inform analysis of the single entity question.  An 
outstanding problem is that none of the case law makes much progress sorting out what 
constitutes ownership and control much less sorting out how they are related and how they 
inform analysis.  Consider the following four examples of “business arrangements:”  
 
 
Governance Scenario 1: An Electricity Marketing Contract
7 
 
An electricity generating firm sells to another firm, an electricity “marketer,” the exclusive rights 
to dispatch electricity from its generators over a 20-year interval.  That is, when the marketer 
makes demands at any time over the next 20 years for the generator to fire up and produce 
electricity, the generator produces electricity, and when the marketer makes demands to cease 
generation, the generator stops production.  The marketer compensates the generator by paying it 
a fixed monthly fee and by covering the generator’s operating expenses.   Thus, even if the 
marketer makes no dispatch demands in a given month, the generator still receives its fixed 
monthly payment.  The generator maintains ownership of its generating units, but it also cedes to 
the marketer rights to veto proposals it might make over the course of the 20-year relationship to 
expand, upgrade or to withdraw generation capacity at the generator’s production sites. 
 
It would be natural to label the relationship between the generator and marketer a “long-term 
contract,” and it might seem artificial to suggest that the generator and marketer collectively 
                                                 
6 Note that “intracorporate conspiracy” can mean different things in different areas of the law.  It has applications in 
criminal matters (e.g., racketeering) and civil rights matters as well as applications in antitrust.  See Smith (1996) on 
applications to civil rights and references to criminal and antitrust matters. 
7 See D.V. Williamson (2003) for evidence about the structure of such contracts.        
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constitute a “single entity.”  Note, however, how “ownership” does not strictly imply “control” 
of underlying assets.  The generator may own the production capacity committed to the 
contractual relationship, but the contract assigns to the marketer important dimensions of control 
to the marketer.  The marketer controls the generator’s output in wholesale electricity markets – 
indeed, that is the marketer’s job – and the veto provision constitutes a way of assigning to the 
marketer some, but not all, control over investment in the generator’s production capacity.   
 
The point of the veto provision is not that the marketer would, as a matter of course, veto any 
and all proposals by the generator to expand, upgrade, or withdraw capacity.  Instead, the 
marketer can use the threat of a veto to hold-up investment and force the marketer to renegotiate 
terms of the contract, such as the level of the fixed monthly payment, in return for acquiescing to 
implement investment proposals.  The marketer might also demand amendments to any one 
proposal.  Either way, the veto provision gives the marketer influence over investment decisions 
by making it incumbent upon the generator to make it worth the marketer’s while to go along 
with the its proposals.   
 
 
Governance Scenario 2: Two Electricity Marketing Contracts 
 
Suppose, now, that an energy marketer has secured long-term dispatch rights in separate 
contracts with each of two generators.  Suppose, also, that these two generators are “actual or 
potential competitors”
8 in that they supply electricity to the same geographic market (“load 
pocket”).  Finally, suppose that each contract includes a veto provision. 
 
The suggestion that the marketer and two generators collectively constitute a single entity might, 
at best, seem audacious.  More likely, antitrust authorities would perceive the arrangement as one 
that enables two competitors (the generators) to neutralize competition between each other.  
Indeed, the generators might separately incorporate a third party and call it the “marketer.”  
When the antitrust authorities come knocking, the parties might trot out the single entity case law 
and tell the authorities to go away claiming that together they constitute a single entity.  
 
What could constitute the basis for a claim to single entity status?  There does exist a single 
party, the marketer, that maintains exclusive control over each generators’ output.  It is not 
obvious, however, that this one party constitutes an “independent center of decision-making” 
with respect to all decisions that are central to the functioning of the candidate single entity.  The 
veto provisions enable the marketer to assume some non-trivial share of control over each 
generator’s investment plans.  Note, however, that the nexus of parties that maintains control 
over one generator’s investment plans is different than the nexus of parties that maintains control 
over the other generator’s investment plans.  The marketer and one generator maintain control 
over that one generator’s plans, and the marketer and the other generator maintain control over 
that other generator’s plans.  These nexuses of control intersect, but might a court use the fact 
that neither of these nexuses of control encapsulates the other to suggest that the business 
arrangement features more than one independent center of decision-making? 
 
 
                                                 
8 City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. (1988) 838 F.2d 268 at 276.        
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Governance Scenario 3: Hospital Networks
9 
 
A number of hospitals form a “network” by incorporating a new entity and assigning governance 
of the new entity to a board of directors.  Each hospital reserves the right to appoint some 
number of directors to the new entity’s board as well as the right to replace those same directors.  
Each hospital also maintains ownership of all its assets, and member hospitals do not transfer 
title to any property that they own to the new entity.  They do assign to the new entity rights to 
veto proposals by any one hospital to expand, upgrade or withdraw services or capacity (e.g., 
“hospital beds”).  The new entity aggregates profits from each hospital so that it may propose 
and finance plans to expand, upgrade or withdraw service capacity.  The new entity restores to 
the hospitals profits it has not earmarked for investment.  Each hospital maintains a veto over 
proposals by the new entity to expand, upgrade or withdraw services or capacity at any of its 
sites. 
 
Note that any proposal to expand, upgrade, or withdraw services or capacity at any one hospital’s 
site requires the approval of both that member hospital and the new entity. Accordingly, the 
particular hospital and the new entity together constitute the nexus of parties that maintains 
authority over investment decisions at the one hospital.  Investment decisions involving another 
hospital involve a different nexus – the nexus composed of that other hospital and the new entity 
– although the two nexuses intersect in that the new entity is party to both nexuses.  Does the 
overlap imply that the two nexuses effectively constitute a single center of decision-making, in 
which case the new entity and all member hospitals might collectively constitute a single entity? 
 
Even if one were to judge that the nexuses constitute distinctly enumerable centers of decision-
making, one might suggest that they do not constitute “independent” centers.  Member hospitals 
each maintain indirect influence over the new entity through their ability to appoint and replace 
directors.  Does indirect influence imply the dependence rather than the independence of the 
various centers of decision-making, in which case the network might again be able to appeal to 
single entity status? 
 
Note also that hospitals’ ownership of their assets does not strictly imply control over those 
assets.  Hospitals share “control” with the new entity, and, member hospitals indirectly influence 
how other hospitals’ assets are disposed by virtue of their rights to appoint and replace directors. 
                                                 
9 The scenario is inspired by letters three different “hospital networks” submitted to the Premerger Notification 
Office of the Federal Trade Commission memorializing guidance they had received from Commission staff 
concerning “the potential reportability of transactions” with respect to rules and regulations implemented under the 
Hart Scott Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.  I reference three letters posted at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/HSR/informal/opinions/9804005.htm, 0010003.htm, and  9908002.htm.  The last of these 
pertains to the “Network Affiliation Agreement” that laid out the structure of the governance of the Evanston 
Northwestern Healthcare Network.   This network is interesting, because the hospitals constituting the network 
secured from the Commission an “informal opinion” that indicated that the merger through which the parties formed 
the network “would not constitute a reportable transaction under the HSR Act.”  In 2004, four years after formation 
of the network, the Commission challenged the merger, and in 2005 the Commission secured a favorable “initial 
decision” from Administrative Law Judge Stephen J. McGuire which is posted at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/051021idtextversion.pdf.  The member hospitals argued that not having to 
report their merger transaction constituted evidence that together they already constituted a single entity before the 
merger.  The judge disagreed, indicating, among other things, evidence that the parties had not constituted a single 
entity at the time of the formation of the Network.         
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Finally, note that the member hospitals pool proceeds.  The pooling of proceeds is integral to the 
efforts of member hospitals to coordinate investment plans.  Does pooling of itself indicate some 
degree of “economic unity,” or does it simply enable anticompetitive coordination among “actual 
or potential competitors?” 
 
 
Governance Scenario 4: Delegation and Reserved Rights in a Traditional Corporate 
Hierarchy 
 
Finally, let’s consider the kind of governance structure contemplated in Copperweld: a hierarchy 
of wholly-owned corporate subsidiaries and its parent.  Traditional corporate hierarchy 
constitutes an obvious benchmark against which to contrast “economic unity” in other 
governance structures, and it constitutes a benchmark that Copperweld and succeeding case law 
inserted into the single entity case law.  This benchmark is interesting partly because it makes 
allowances for the prospect that some parties to a governance structure might delegate 
managerial functions to other parties.  Does delegation amount to abdication of control, in which 
case single entity status might be jeopardized, or does it reflect control, in which case single 
entity status remains secure?  The single entity case law indicates the latter: delegating functions 
to other parties is consistent with single entity status.
10 
 
Consider a parent corporation that wholly owns some number of separately incorporated 
subsidiaries.  Suppose also that some of these subsidiaries themselves wholly own some other 
separately incorporated subsidiaries.  These subsidiaries constitute “indirect subsidiaries” of the 
parent.  Thus, the parent’s subsidiaries are themselves parents to the indirect subsidiaries.  
Suppose that a parent anywhere in the hierarchy may delegate managerial functions to any its 
own subsidiaries or indirect subsidiaries and that any parent reserves the right to take back 
functions it had previously delegated.  The pattern of delegation and reserved rights will 
illuminate a hierarchy of corporate entities.  It turns out that this hierarchy corresponds exactly to 
the hierarchy that the pattern of ownership illuminates.   
 
The complete agreement of these two hierarchies constitutes the benchmark case featured in 
Copperweld, and the law has extended single entity status to this benchmark case.  What 
happens, however, as we deviate from this benchmark?  Specifically, what happens when the 
hierarchy indicated by the pattern of ownership deviates in small or large measure from the 
hierarchy indicated by the pattern of delegation? 
 
 
3.  Law and Economics of Control Rights 
                                                 
10 The court of appeals in Seagram and Sons v. Hawaiian Oke (1969) observed that “sound management demands 
extensive delegation of authority within the organization.” (pg. 83)  In overturning the lower court, the appeals court 
observed that “under the trial court’s ruling, the more delegation there is, the more danger there will be that the 
holders of such delegated authority will be found by a court to be capable of conspiring with each other in carrying 
on the corporation's business,” the conclusion being that “the doctrine [of intra-corporate conspiracy] hands to 
plaintiffs, on a silver platter, an automatically self-proving conspiracy.” (pp. 83-84)  Copperweld itself identifies 
control with the power to “delegate” managerial functions to otherwise “autonomous units” (pg. 771) and with the 
power to take managerial functions back (pp. 771-772).        
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The ultimate question is this: Is the “single entity” a sham or does it constitute a governance 
structure that serves the legitimate exercise of control rights in each of the scenarios?  What 
constitutes “legitimate” and “control rights” is not obvious.  I take these up in turn.   
 
 
3.1  The legitimate exercise of control 
 
One might be tempted to identify “legitimate” purposes with efficiencies.  One might inquire, for 
example, about what efficiencies the single entity achieves that the parties could not separately 
achieve.
11  The suggestion is that candidate single entities that merely join horizontally-situated 
parties – those arrangements in which parties are not contributing complementary inputs – have 
no business appealing to a single entity defense at all.  A problem with that approach is that it 
provides a rationale for third parties (e.g., the court or a regulator) to abrogate property rights 
and, as we will see, the control rights that property rights imply.  An oil company, for example, 
may operate two technologically identical refineries across the street from each other.  A rule 
that afforded single entity status only to combinations of assets that generated obvious 
“efficiencies” might allow a third party to march in and compel the oil company to spinoff one of 
its two refineries. 
 
Pre and post-Copperweld single entity case law is not explicit about the hazards of enabling third 
parties to abrogate control rights, but one of the more direct statements about the hazards derives 
from Murphy Tugboat (1979) 467 F.Supp. 841.  Paraphrasing the court of appeals in Seagram 
and Sons v. Hawaiian Oke (1969), the Murphy Tugboat court observed that “Indiscriminate 
application of Section 1 to commonly owned or controlled corporations could therefore have 
absurd and counterproductive results, subjecting them to liability for ‘an automatically self-
proving conspiracy’ on account of activity necessarily arising out of or inherently connected with 
common ownership or control.” (pg. 860)  Copperweld itself (pg. 771) suggests a 
complementary rationale.  It imposes the presumption that intracorporate “coordinated conduct” 
generates “benefits” – benefits that outside parties might be poorly equipped to identify and 
should be circumspect about disrupting. 
 
 
3.2 Control  Rights 
 
Economic theory provides not so much an affirmative theory of control but rather a body of 
theory about when, where and to whom to assign “control rights.”  One must ask, “Rights to 
control what?”  An (admittedly abstract) answer is “assets,” or, the same thing, the inputs parties 
contribute to the production of some good or service.  Assets may include not merely the kinds 
of things to which it is easy to assign property rights such as plant and equipment but also 
intangibles such as trademarks and rights-of-way to commercialize patented technologies.  
Assets may also include things over which it is difficult to assign property rights such as “know-
how” or other inalienable human resources or intellectual properties.  
                                                 
11 The appeal to “efficiencies” amounts to an inquiry of whether or not constituent parties contribute complementary 
assets, complementary capabilities, or other complementary inputs, or, the same thing, amounts to an inquiry of 
whether or not the candidate single entity incorporates important vertical dimensions.        
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It is important to note that most economic theory, including the theory that is traditionally 
applied to antitrust, need not make contact with control.  Most theory is occupied with sorting 
out plans parties implement for deploying their assets and efforts.  These plans may take the 
form of “production plans” implemented within the firm, formal contracts between firms, tacit 
agreements and so on.  Insofar as a plan is nothing more than a set of scripted instructions, it is 
not obvious that it makes a difference whether parties implement a plan within the firm or 
between firms.
12  It makes no difference (yet) how parties organize production.  Rather, parties 
contribute inputs, implement plans, and that is that.  Questions about what governance structures 
constitute single entities are not cognizable within the framework.  The key point is that nothing 
needs to be controlled so long as there is no demand to deviate from the plan.  But why deviate?  
What would induce demand to deviate?  Control, it turns out, becomes a concern once demands 
for deviations arise – that is, when contingencies arise for which parties have not made 
allowances in their plans. 
 
Questions about why parties would not have made allowances for certain contingencies point up 
deep issues about how they adapt business arrangements to changing circumstances (Williamson 
1971, 1974, 1985, 2005a, 2005b).  Why would parties have failed to explicitly account for 
certain contingencies in their plans?  Does the prospect that such contingencies arise motivate 
parties to find economical ways to adapt their plans?
13  Can it be economical to selectively leave 
plans incomplete in some ways?  Finally, the control question: Given demands for adaptation 
arise, who crafts the adaptations to be made and who implements the adaptations?  In short, who 
gets to assume and exercise control?   
 
The answer suggested in Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), Moore (1992) and 
Hart (1995) is the parties who own the assets get to assume and exercise control.  “Given a 
contract will not specify all aspects of asset usage in every contingency, who has the right to 
decide about missing usages? … [I]t is the owner of the asset in question who has this right.  
That is, the owner of an asset has residual control rights over that asset: the right to decide all 
usages of the asset in any way not inconsistent with a prior contract, custom, or law” (Hart 1995, 
pg. 30). 
 
This line of research imposes structure on the single entity question in three ways.  First, and 
most importantly, it suggests a way of understanding how “ownership” and “control” are related.  
Ownership implies control rights, which are the rights to decide how to redeploy assets in the 
event uncontracted-for contingencies arise.  Ownership does not imply all control rights.  Parties 
could (and often do) allocate control rights to non-owners.  Three of the Governance Scenarios 
discussed above featured veto provisions.  Veto provisions constitute one way parties assign to 
non-owners some say over how certain assets are redeployed – hence the qualification in Hart 
(1995) that ownership implies control rights that are “residual” in that other parties may have 
                                                 
12 In the language of game theory, a plan is a “strategy” – a script indicating actions a party is to take at any 
contingency that might arise.  The writer of the script could just as well seal it in an envelope, hand it to a manager 
to implement, and walk away. 
13 Research on adaptation in economic relationships is well established.  Usual suspects include Masten and Crocker 
(1985), Crocker and Masten (1988, 1991), Crocker and Reynolds (1993), Joskow (1987, 1988), and Goldberg and 
Erickson (1987).  More recent contributors include Saussier (2000), Bajari and Tadelis (2000), Tadelis (2002), Zhu 
(1999, 2003) and Zhang and Zhu (2000).        
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reserved some rights by “prior contract, custom, or law.”  Second, the appeal to residual control 
rights suggests a benchmark against which to judge “economic unity:” It is plausible to suggest 
that a candidate single entity may secure single entity status on the basis of economic unity by 
demonstrating that it maintains all residual control rights.  Maintaining all residual control rights 
amounts to owning all of the assets engaged in production.  Finally, the appeal to residual control 
rights suggests a simple way of identifying single entities that satisfy this benchmark of 
economic unity.  One can delineate the single entities that satisfy the test of economic unity 
simply by identifying the nexus of parties that collectively own the assets engaged in production.  
Thus, if two parties separately or collectively own assets engaged in production, one includes 
those two parties in the single entity. 
 
One should note that the appeal to residual control rights implies a concept of “economic unity” 
that is much more parochial than the concept the single entity case law anticipates.  Copperweld 
and succeeding case law anticipate a concept of economic unity that depends on “centers of 
decision-making” not on “centers of residual decision-making.”  Residual control rights, as 
opposed to control rights, may mean very little if the candidate single entity has signed away the 
most important control rights.  Thus, one might want to include in any effort to delineate a single 
entity those parties that do maintain those most important control rights even if they own no 
assets and maintain no residual control rights.  Instead, appealing to residual control rights alone 
might lead one to extend single entity status to a party that is really no more than a component of 
a larger entity.  In the first Governance Scenario, for example, the appeal to residual control 
rights would suggest that the long-term contractual relationship between the marketer and 
generator fail the test of economic unity.  In contrast, a concept of economic unity that depends 
on how parties allocate all control rights might provide a rationale for extending single entity 
status to the relationship. 
 
 
3.3  Nexuses of Control 
 
The advantage of a test of economic unity that depends only on residual control rights is that 
there is a unique and simple way to operationalize it: just sort out who owns the assets that the 
candidate single entity uses.  Evidence that ownership is concentrated in the hands of a single 
party is consistent with single entity status.  In contrast, operationalizing a concept of economic 
unity that depends on control rights may require more structure.  Identifying assets and 
ownership of assets may not be enough, because the most important aspects of control might 
reside with control rights that non-owners secure, not with the residual control rights that asset 
ownership implies.  Thus, one must also sort out the control rights that parties assume by 
“contract, custom, or law.” 
 
The point of this section is to suggest how the broader concept of control rights can 
operationalize “economic unity.”  The suggestion is that control rights provide a simple way of 
identifying “nexuses of control,” one nexus for each of the assets parties engage in production 
wherein each nexus is composed of those parties who reserve control rights specific to that asset.  
In the first Governance Scenario, the marketer and generator might argue that they each bring 
important assets to their collaboration.  At the very least, the generator contributes generating 
assets (generators).  Assume, for the sake of argument, that the marketer contributes physical        
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assets and intangible assets (e.g., “know-how” and “capabilities”) that collectively amount to 
“marketing services.”  The generator maintains no control rights with respect to the assets that 
the marketer owns, in which case the nexus of parties that maintain all control rights with respect 
to the marketer’s assets is composed exclusively by the marketer.  In contrast, the nexus of 
parties that maintains all control rights with respect to the generating assets is composed by the 
generator and marketer.
14  (See Figure 2.1.) 
 
The appeal to nexuses of control lends itself to a surprisingly broad array of criteria against 
which to measure economic unity.  I indicate a sequence of six benchmark criteria here ordered 
from strongest to weakest:  
 
Criterion 1 – All nexuses of control are identical
15: More than one party may belong to 
different nexuses of control.  Evidence that some party belongs to one nexus but not 
another indicates that not all nexuses are the same.  In contrast, evidence that all nexuses 
are the same constitutes a criterion through which to suggest that the candidate single entity 
maintains a single, independent center of decision-making. 
 
Counter example: Two parties, A and B, contribute two assets to production.  Party A 
constitutes the nexus of control with respect to one asset, and parties A and B constitute the 
nexus of control with respect to another asset.  The second nexus encapsulates the first, but, 
nonetheless, the two nexuses are distinguishable.  The candidate single entity fails the 
implied test of economic unity.  (See Figure 2.1.) 
 
Criterion 2 – Encapsulated nexuses of control
16: One can characterize all nexuses of control as 
a sequence of nexuses that encapsulate each other.  In contrast, consider nexuses of control 
that may intersect but do not encapsulate each other.  One might decide that nexuses of 
control not encapsulated by some other nexus of control constitute independent centers of 
decision-making.  Thus, evidence that a candidate single entity features more than one non-
encapsulated nexus of control frustrates appeal to single entity status. 
 
Example: This example satisfies the test of economic unity implied by Criterion 2 but fails 
the test implied by Criterion 1.  Suppose three parties, A, B, and C, engage three assets in 
production.  Party A constitutes a nexus of control with respect to one asset, parties A and 
B constitute a second nexus of control with respect to a second asset, and parties A, B, and 
C constitute a third nexus with respect to the third and last asset.  These three nexuses of 
control constitute a sequence of nested nexuses in that the third nexus encapsulates the 
                                                 
14 One should note that the nexus of the marketer and generator maintains control rights with respect to many, but 
not all, of the assets the two parties engage in production.  Third parties, for example, may own the wires that 
transmit the generator’s electricity to the transmission grid and across the transmission grid.  Accordingly, the nexus 
of parties that maintain control rights with respect to transmission assets excludes the generator and marketer.  Thus, 
one can identify the boundaries between nexuses of control.  There is the nexus composed of the marketer and 
generator, and there is the nexus of parties who maintain control rights over transmission assets.  These two nexuses 
of control are mutually exclusive. 
15 In set-theoretic terms, the criterion amounts to indicating that the set of parties composed of the union of all 
nexuses of control is identical to the set of parties composed of the intersection of all nexuses. 
16 The criterion amounts to indicating that the set of parties indicated by the intersection of any two nexuses of 
control is itself a nexus of control with respect to some asset.        
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second which, in turn, encapsulates the first.  (See Figure 2.2.)  Note also that the 
governance structure featured in Figure 2.1 also satisfies Criterion 2. 
 
Criterion 3 – A unique nexus of control belongs to all other nexuses of control
17: For each 
asset parties engage in production, one identifies the nexus of parties that maintain control 
rights with respect to that asset.  Evidence that one nexus of control is encapsulated within 
all other nexuses of control constitutes a way of suggesting that control is concentrated in 
that one nexus and, in turn, that one can identify the single entity with the collection of 
assets over which that nexus maintains some control rights. 
 
Example: This example satisfies the test of economic unity implied by Criterion 3 but fails 
the tests implied by Criteria 1 and 2.  Suppose, again, that three parties engage three assets 
in production.  Party A constitutes one nexus, parties A and B constitute a second nexus, 
and parties A and C the third nexus.  (See Figure 2.3.)  The nexus composed of party A is 
belongs to all three nexuses of control. 
 
Criterion 4 – A unique cluster of parties belongs to all nexuses of control
18: Evidence that 
one cluster of parties belongs to all nexuses of control constitutes a way of suggesting that 
control is concentrated in that cluster of parties and, in turn, that one can identify the single 
entity with the collection of assets over which that cluster of parties maintains some control 
rights. 
 
Example: This example satisfies the test of economic unity implied by Criterion 4 but fails 
the tests implied by Criteria 1, 2 and 3.  Suppose that three parties engage two assets in 
production.  Parties A and B constitute one nexus, and parties A and C constitute the 
second nexus.  (See Figure 2.4.)  Party A belongs to both nexuses of control. 
 
Criterion 5 – The agglomeration of intersecting nexuses of control: Suppose some nexuses of 
control overlap but do not encapsulate each other as in the second Governance Scenario.  
(In that scenario, the marketer was party to two different nexuses of control.)  One could 
suggest that the union of all overlapping nexuses indicates the extent of economic unity 
and, in turn, indicates the boundaries of the single entity. 
 
Example: This example satisfies the test of economic unity implied by Criterion 5 but fails 
the tests implied by Criteria 1, 2 , 3 and 4.  Suppose that three parties engage four assets in 
production.  Parties A and B constitute one nexus, and parties A and C constitute a second 
nexus, and parties A and B each separately constitute the remaining two nexuses of control.  
(See Figure 2.5.)  The agglomeration of all four intersecting nexuses encapsulates all three 
parties. 
 
Criterion 6 – The agglomeration of all nexuses of control: For each asset parties engage in 
production, one identifies the nexus of parties that maintain control rights with respect to 
that asset.  One identifies the single entity with the agglomeration of all nexuses of control 
whether or not any of the nexuses intersect. 
                                                 
17 There exists some nexus of control that is identical to the intersection of all nexuses. 
18 There exists at least one party that is encapsulated by the intersection of all nexuses.        
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Example: This example satisfies the test of economic unity implied by Criterion 6 but fails 
the tests implied by Criteria 1, 2 , 3, 4 and 5.  Suppose that three parties engage two assets 
in production.  Parties A and B constitute one nexus, and party C constitute the second 
nexus.  (See Figure 2.6.)  The two nexus are entirely disjoint but satisfy the criterion. 
 
Criterion 1 indicates an intendedly strong test, whereas Criterion 6 constitutes an intendedly 
weak test.  One may observe that Criterion 1 is “nested” within Criterion 2 in that any candidate 
single entity that satisfies Criterion 1 will also satisfy Criterion 2.  That is, Criterion 1 constitutes 
a more demanding test of economic unity than Criterion 2.  Similarly, Criterion 2 is nested 
within Criterion 3, Criterion 3 is nested within Criterion 4, and so on.  If we define “>” as the 
relation “is more demanding than,” then one can order the six criteria as follows: 
 
Criterion 1 > Criterion 2 > Criterion 3 > Criterion 4 > Criterion 5 > Criterion 6 
 
Note that the governance structure featured in Governance Scenario 1 (a marketer and a 
generator) would fail the test of economic unity implied by Criterion 1 and would satisfy the 
tests of economic unity implied by Criteria 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.
19  In contrast, Scenario 2 (a marketer 
and two unaffiliated generators) would fail the tests of economic unity implied by Criteria 1 and 
2 and would satisfy the tests of economic unity implied by Criteria 3, 4, 5, and 6.
20  Scenario 3 
(the hospital network) would fail the test of economic unity implied by Criteria 1, 2, and 3 and 
would satisfy the test of economic unity implied by Criteria 4, 5, and 6.  Finally, Scenario 4 (the 
traditional corporate hierarchy) satisfies the test of economic unity implied by all six criteria.  All 
control rights ultimately reside with the ultimate parent thus indicating that the only nexus of 
control consists exclusively of the ultimate parent. (See Figure 2.7.) 
 
 
3.4  Observations, caveats and extensions 
 
While the Governance Scenarios do not exhaust the range of governance structures one might 
consider, the results leave open questions about what action is left out that should not be left out 
and, no less importantly, what action is left out that should remain left out.  I elaborate six points 
here: 
 
(1)  All assets are treated symmetrically: The appeal to control rights alone does not 
distinguish between bottleneck assets and assets that feature lesser degrees of 
complementarity.  Some assets may contribute little to the commercial potential of 
production whereas the exclusion of other assets might completely frustrate production.  
One might want to impose more structure on the analysis of economic unity by assigning 
greater weight to control rights that pertain to bottleneck assets and less weight to control 
                                                 
19 If we assume that the marketer does not contribute any assets to production but only reserves control rights with 
respect to the generator’s assets, then the governance structure satisfies the test of economic unity implied by all six 
criteria. 
20 If we assume that the marketer does not contribute any assets to production but only reserves control rights with 
respect to the two generators’ assets, then the governance structure no longer satisfies the test of economic unity 
implied by Criterion 3.        
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rights that pertain to less important assets.  No uniquely obvious way to assign weights 
presents itself. 
 
(2)  Weak property rights yield few control rights: “Ownership” confers residual control 
rights only to the extent that property rights can be defined and enforced.  More generally, 
property rights yield control rights only to the extent that they can be defined and enforced.  
Property rights may be uncertain (Merges 2005, D.V. Williamson 2005, Arora and Merges 
2004, Majewski and Williamson 2004, Anand and Galetovic 2000), in which case they 
may confer few, if any, effective rights.  Assets such as intellectual properties, for example, 
may be hard to define in the first place.  A line in the sand may go far toward defining 
beachfront properties, but parties might not be able to distinguish fine lines between 
intellectual properties.  The upshot is that parties might not be in much of a position to 
assign control rights much less to exclude others from using the asset.   
 
(3)  All control rights are treated symmetrically: One can imagine enriching the framework 
by distinguishing the residual control rights that attend ownership from all other control 
rights.  Again, no uniquely obvious way of weighing residual control rights presents itself, 
but one could, for example, go so far as to accord the bundle of residual control rights that 
attend ownership of an asset the status of an asset itself.  This amounts to making each 
individual owner of an asset a nexus of control with respect to that asset.  In Governance 
Scenario 1 (a marketer and a generator), treating the generator’s residual control rights as 
an asset would change the analysis.  The governance structure would not no longer satisfy 
the test of economic unity implied by Criterion 2 and would fail the tests implied by 
Criteria 1, 2, 3 and 4.  Similarly, the example of the hospital network featured in 
Governance Scenario 3 would no longer satisfy Criterion 4 and would fail the tests of 
economic unity implied by Criteria 1, 2, 3, and 4. 
 
(4)  Control rights do not illuminate influence parties exert through board participation: 
The appeal to control rights says nothing about influence parties may exert through their 
ability to appoint or withdraw board members or to control votes.  That leaves open the 
question of how board participation informs analysis of “economic unity.”  The case law 
has no definite answers to this question, but in Fraser (2002), the court suggested that 
parties’ board participation complicates the appeal to single entity status on the basis of 
economic unity, because parties “are not mere servants” of the candidate single entity (pg. 
57). 
 
(5)  Profit-sharing does not inform “economic unity:” The appeal to control rights says 
nothing about profit-sharing or, the same thing, risk-sharing.  The important point, 
however, is the converse – that profit-sharing does not inform economic unity.  The 
licensee of a patent, for example, may generate profits by commercializing the patent, but 
that licensee may yet yield licensing fees to the patent holder.  The licensing fees constitute 
a scheme by which the licensee and patent holder share profits.  The fact that the parties 
commit to a schedule of licensing fees does not imply that the patent holder or licensor 
have secured control rights beyond those they already maintained.  Rather, profit-sharing is 
integral to the effort to commercialize the patent.  Similarly, the fixed monthly mortgage 
fees a homeowner pays to the bank can be understood as a profit-sharing scheme, but it        
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would be hard to suggest that the scheme implies that the homeowner and bank constitute a 
single entity.  The homeowner yields a stream of services from the asset (the dwelling), and 
the homeowner bears the risk that housing prices may go down. 
 
  As a matter of economic theory, profit-sharing schemes matter insofar as parties can use 
them to align each others’ incentives.
21  But incentive alignment alone says nothing about 
control.  Specifically, incentive alignment says nothing about how parties adapt plans to 
uncontracted-for contingencies. 
 
(6)  Renegotiation illuminates the allocation of control rights: An easy way to determine 
how control rights are allocated among parties to a governance structure is to look for 
mechanisms that allow one party to impose renegotiation on another.  We have already 
noted the role of veto provisions in enabling one party to hold-up another party and impose 
renegotiation.  Veto provisions indicate that more than one party constitute the nexus of 
control with respect to a particular asset.  A researcher seeking to inform a single entity 
inquiry should also look for exit provisions in the contracts, by-laws or other structures 
governing the workings of the candidate single entity.  Provisions that enable some party to 
exit a relationship enable that same party to impose renegotiation over the terms of 
exchange between the parties in that relationship.  Such provisions indicate that some party 
reserves control rights with respect to a particular asset.  A naïve interpretation of exit 
provisions is that they constitute tripwires that automatically induce exit when those 
provisions get tripped.  A more sophisticated interpretation is that exit provisions constitute 
options for some party to impose renegotiation by threatening to exit.  (See Crocker and 
Masten 1988, 1991 on options and renegotiation processes.) 
 
 
4.  A Two-stage Sequence of Single Entity tests 
 
The single entity case law proposes a number of single entity tests, some of which have proven 
to be more robust than others.
22  Some of these candidate tests stumble around “control” and 
could be subsumed in a larger test of economic unity.  Other tests focus on efficiencies and can 
be subsumed within a larger efficiencies test or “actual or potential competitors” test.  I will take 
these up in turn, but first I want to put to rest a third “unity of interest” test upon which the case 
law has periodically stubbed its toe. 
 
Some of the case law seems to suggest that a defining feature of a single entity is a “unity of 
interest” between its constituent entities.
23  The law has been shy about defining what constitutes 
a “unity of interest,” but, even if we take it at face value, we can identify at least three immediate 
problems with the test.  First, both economics and some of the single entity case law recognize 
that conflict as well as mutual interests may characterize much of what goes on within single 
entities.  In Chicago Professional Sports LP v. National Basketball Association (1996) 95 F.3d 
593, for example, Judge Easterbrook observes that “Even a single firm contains many competing 
                                                 
21 See chapter 2 in Laffont and Martimort (2002). 
22 Various single entity tests are catalogued in Belsley (1996) and Kaiser (2004). 
23 Copperweld (1984) at 769, Mt. Pleasant (1988) at 276, Iain Fraser et al. v. Major League Soccer, LLC et al. 
(2002) 284 F.3d 47 at 58.        
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interests... Copperweld does not hold that only conflict-free enterprises may be treated as single 
entities.” (pg. 598)  Indeed, the prospect of conflict leads inexorably to the governance question 
that John R. Commons had posed: Can the parties craft a governance structure that allows them 




Second, even members of cartels may perceive both the prospect of mutual gain and conflict.  
Thus, we stumble upon John R. Commons’s governance question again.  Even cartel members 
may choose to design a governance structure that allows them to remedy conflict so that they 
may achieve mutual gains.  The problem with cartels, of course, is that society’s losses (from 
higher prices, restricted output, underinvestment and whatnot) outweigh cartel members’ 
collective gains. 
 
The third problem with the appeal to a “unity of interest” is that the case law sometimes 
conflates it with tests pertaining to “actual or potential competition.”  (See, for example, Mt. 
Pleasant at 276.)  The upshot is that “unity of interest” tests are a distraction from the real action.  
I now turn to that action. 
 
 
4.1  Test 1: The “economic unity” test 
 
The case law offers a sequence of two tests.  (See the decision tree featured in Figure 1.) The 
first test creates a safe harbor for commercial institutions that the authorities, including the 
antitrust authorities, have no business poking their noses into.  The second test amounts to a de 
facto rule-of-reason analysis for institutions that might yet merit single entity status but which 
could also serve as cover for cartels.  Courts have appealed to the second test when candidate 
single entities have failed the first test.   
 
The first test, an “economic unity” test, inquires whether or not parties are already effectively 
integrated within a single entity.
25  This is effectively a test of how concentrated control rights 
are.  Evidence that control rights are fragmented and distributed across constituent entities 
frustrates the appeal to single entity status. 
 
Pairing “economic unity” with “delegation” provides a way of operationalizing “control rights” 
that is consistent with the case law.  A single party within a single entity may not actively 
manage mechanical affairs such as setting prices but rather may delegate management functions 
                                                 
24 This is an old, robust and important idea in economics.  Oliver Williamson has paraphrased John R. Commons 
many times on this count: “Commons ... recognized that economic organization is not merely a response to 
technological features – economies of scale; economies of scope; other physical and technical aspects – but often 
has the purpose of harmonizing relations between parties who are otherwise in actual or potential conflict 
(Commons, 1934, p. 6).  The proposition that economic organization has the purpose of promoting the continuity of 
relationships by devising specialized governance structures, rather than permitting relationships to fracture under the 
hammer of unassisted market contracting, was thus an insight that could have been gleaned from Commons.” See 
Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985), pg. 3 and John R. Commons, Institutional 
Economics (1989[1934]). 
25 Copperweld (1984) at 770, Arleen Freeman et al. v. San Diego Association of Realtors (2003) 322 F.3d 1133 at 
1148, Jack Russell Terrier Network v. American Kennel Club (2005) 407 F.3d 1027 at 1034.        
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to other parties.  These other parties may in turn delegate functions to other units.  In a traditional 
corporate hierarchy, the pattern of delegation will trace out a hierarchical tree.  That tree will 
have three features: (1) Parties higher up the hierarchy may delegate functions to parties lower 
on the hierarchy; (2) Parties lower down will not delegate functions to parties higher up; (3) 
Parties lower down will not reserve control rights that the some party higher up could not 
abrogate.  In contrast, one can distinguish unintegrated agglomerations of single entities by 
distinguishing patterns of delegation that deviate from a hierarchical tree structure.  Specifically, 
unintegrated single entities may delegate no functions to each other.  (They may be entirely 
independent.)  Alternatively, they may delegate functions to each other or may share control of 
certain functions.  They might, for example, each reserve vetoes over decisions to liquidate 
assets, to spin other parties off, or to be spun off. 
 
The law is disposed to identify “economic unity” with top-down, one-way, hierarchical control.  
The law accepts as single entities agglomerations that satisfy “economic unity,” and it may stop 
analysis of the single entity issue there rather than bother to proceed to other tests, but observe 
what is and is not going on.  “Economic unity” says nothing about the welfare-enhancing, 
efficiency-generating features of such agglomerations.  Rather the test provides a safe harbor 
against the courts marching in and abrogating established property rights and control rights.  
Even so, the law does not limit single entity status to agglomerations exhibiting purely top-down, 
hierarchical control.  Rather, it may extend single entity status to agglomerations that feature less 
but enough “economic unity.” 
 
Both pre and post-Copperweld single entity case law features examples of single entity defenses 
that failed some version of “economic unity” tests.  Single entity defenses failed such tests in 
Freeman (2003), New York v. Saint Francis Hospital, Vassar Brothers Hospital and Mid-
Hudson Health (2000) 94 F.Supp.2d 399, Robert M. Bogan v. Northwestern Mutual Life 
Insurance Company (1997) 953 F.Supp. 532, Malcolm Weiss v. York Hospital et al. (1984) 745 
F.2d 786, SMMS v. United States (1982) 1 Cl.Ct. 188 and National Society of Professional 
Engineers v. United States (1978) 435 U.S. 679.  The court accepted a single entity defense on 
the basis of economic unity in Seagram and Sons v. Hawaiian Oke (1969) at 83. 
 
  
4.2  Test 2: The “actual or potential competitors” test 
 
The law does not indicate a fine line between enough and not enough “economic unity,” but it 
does appeal to a second test in instances in which the degree of “economic unity” remains in 
question.  Consider, for example, how the law might view a patent licensing agreement.  A 
patent holder and a licensee might each reserve certain control rights, thus deviating from a strict 
model of top-down, hierarchical control.  They might even be members of distinct corporate 
families.  Even so, the law might accept the relationship between the patent holder and licensee 
as a single entity for the purpose of analyzing competition in certain markets.
26 
 
                                                 
26 “Certain markets” is an important qualification.  The law might extend single entity status to parties collaborating 
in the production of goods or services sold in one market but might deny single entity status to the same parties were 
they actual or potential competitors in another market.        
  19
There are many ways a licensing agreement may fail a strict “economic unity” test.  A patent 
holder could not, for example, bar a licensee from liquidating its own assets.  A patent license 
might include important exit provisions that might go some way toward channeling the 
disposition of parties’ assets in the event of liquidation, but it is not obvious that one party could 
compel the other to remain in business.  Even so, for the purpose of commercializing a patent, a 
patent holder and licensee might institute a governance structure that features much “economic 
unity.”  Specifically, a patent holder might delegate to a licensee all types of functions – 
functions that only the patent holder would be in a position to delegate. 
 
Courts have not, in general, explicitly distinguished exit provisions as important ways to identify 
how parties allocate control rights, but in Chicago Professional Sports Judge Easterbrook did 
observe in passing that “the 29 [NBA] clubs, unlike GM's plants, have the right to secede 
(wouldn't a plant manager relish that!), and rearrange into two or three leagues.” (Pg. 599)  In yet 
other cases evidence of the absence of exit provisions enabled parties to satisfy an “economic 
unity” test.  Lack of exit provisions indicates that one party (e.g., the “parent”) can compel 
another party (a “subsidiary”) to stay in business.  In HealthAmerica the court accepted a 
particular hospital “Alliance” as a single entity, partly because the parent exclusively reserved 




Control rights in the patent licensing example may not be entirely concentrated, but both pre and 
post-Copperweld single entity case law make allowances for extending single entity status to 
some hybrid arrangements.  It does this by extending the analysis to a de facto rule-of-reason 
analysis.  It inquires whether or not parties to the candidate single entity constitute “actual or 
potential competitors.”  The point of the test is to distinguish whether or not the candidate single 
entity joins complementary assets, capabilities or other complementary inputs together.
28  The 
alternative is that the parties constitute “actual or potential competitors,” in which case it 
becomes much less obvious that the candidate single entity is anything but a sham institution. 
 
Courts have appealed to complementarity to extend single entity status to hybrid arrangements 
like franchising (Don Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nevada [1993] 999 F.2d 445), patent licenses 
(Levi Case Company v. ATS Products [1992] 788 F.Supp. 428), exclusive contracts (Calculators 
Hawaii Inc. v. Brandt Inc.[1983] 724 F.2d 1332; Superior Models v. Tolkien Enterprises [1981] 
1981 WL 2103; Discon Inc. v. NYNEX Corp. [1996] 93 F.3d 1055), certification authorities 
(Jack Russell [2005]), and networks (Mt. Pleasant [1988], Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc. [1979] 441 U.S. 1).  As Lehn and Sykuta (1997) observe, courts have 
also extended single entity status on the basis of complementarity to the National Hockey League 
(San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League et al. [1974] 379 F.Supp. 966) but not 
                                                 
27 HealthAmerica 428: “An Affiliate must seek approval of Susquehanna Alliance before it acquires, purchases, 
sells, leases or otherwise transfers any property.  Id. at 42.  No Affiliate may incur any capital indebtedness unless 
expressly authorized by the Alliance.  Id. at  43.  Absent express authorization, [the constituent parties] NCPHS and 
PHS may not merge, consolidate, reorganize or enter into any joint venture, management or alliance agreement that 
would affect autonomy or governance with any entity not a party to the Alliance Agreement.  Id. at  44.  Under the 
Alliance Agreement, no party may terminate any program or service or initiate any program or service without the 
prior approval of the Chief Executive Officer or the Board of Directors of Susquehanna Alliance.” 
28 See, for example, Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society (1982) 457 U.S. 332 at 355-356, the various 
sports league rulings, and others.          
  20
uniformly to the other leagues including the National Football League.  In each case parties 
contributed complementary inputs, although courts were not always explicit about this.  In 
franchising, for example, a franchiser contributes a valuable asset, the brand name.  Franchisees 
contribute labor and other complementary inputs. 
 
The appeal to complementarity has enabled courts to fill in one potential pitfall. A court might 
observe that parties are not “actual competitors,” and it would be tempting to then accept a single 
entity defense.  A problem is that parties could constitute a cartel of “potential competitors.”  The 
potential for competition sets up the prospect of conflict, and that motivates a role for the 
governance of the cartel: to neutralize the prospect of cartel members actually competing with 
each other.  Thus, absence of actual competition may merely mask the reality of competition that 
would obtain but for the horizontal restraints instituted in the governance of the cartel.  A way to 
distinguish whether or not parties are potential competitors is to distinguish whether or not they 
contribute complementary inputs. 
 
The Freeman court is not explicit on complementarity, but it provides the best statement on this 
count and picks up on the governance question.  The court observed “[I]n the absence of 
economic unity, the fact that firms are not actual competitors is also usually not enough, by 
itself, to render them a single entity.   Absence of actual competition may simply be a 
manifestation of the anticompetitive agreement itself, as where firms conspire to divide the 
market.   See Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 344 n. 15, 102 S.Ct. 2466 (division of 
markets is per se illegal).   Cases have required instead that the constituent entities be neither 
actual nor potential competitors, City of Mt. Pleasant, 838 F.2d at 276, cf. Williams, 794 F.Supp. 
at 1031” (Freeman at 1148-49). 
 
Single entity defenses have failed some version of an “actual or potential competitors” test in 
Freeman (realtor associations), Maricopa County (medical associations), Professional Engineers 
(another professional association), and Citizen Publishing Company v. United States (1969) 394 
U.S. 131 (a joint operating agreement). 
 
  
5.  Applying the single entity tests 
 
5.1  Sports leagues and network effects 
 
A casual survey of the single entity case law will reveal a preponderance of cases involving 
sports leagues.  This is no accident.  Sports leagues have coordinated much of the business of 
constituent teams.  Coordination has often involved the imposition of restraints such as 
restrictions on the geographic assignment of teams or restrictions on the hiring of players and 
coaches.  The fact that leagues do not obviously constitute single entities on the basis of 
economic unity has enabled parties seeking relief from restraints to press conspiracy claims 
under section 1 of the Sherman Act.  Team owners have, for example, pressed antitrust claims in 
order to secure relief from restrictions on relocating teams (e.g. Seals [1974], Los Angeles 
Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League et al. v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd. 
[1984] 726 F.2d 1381).  Even so, sports leagues have posed single entity defenses, and courts 
have, for the most part, seriously entertained such defenses not on the basis of economic unity        
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but on the grounds that teams themselves constitute complementary inputs to the production of 
“games.”
29  Courts have further entertained single entity defenses on the grounds that the entities 
representing the leagues (e.g., the NFL, NBA and NHL) have themselves contributed inputs that 
are complementary to the production of games (e.g., Fraser [2002] at 56, Chicago Professional 
Sports [1996] at 599, Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum [1984] at 1390, James McCoy Smith v. 
Pro Football Inc. and the National Football League [1979] 593 F.2d 1173 at 1195.). 
 
The appeal to complementarity has allowed courts to appeal to versions of the “actual or 
potential competitors” test of single entity status.  Courts have recognized at least two types of 
complementarity that drive the economics of sports leagues.  One can analogize one type of 
complementarity to demand-side “network effects,” and one can analogize the other type to 
supply-side “network effects” (Tirole 1991, pp. 404-408).  The demand-side reflects the fact that 
the production of goods or services requires the input of more than one entity.  Phone networks 
constitute an extreme example.  Just as a phone network that includes only one phone is useless, 
so too a network that includes only one team is useless.  Phones in a telephone network are 
complements when it comes to the “production” of telephone services insofar as users perceive 
greater value to having access to a larger, rather than smaller, network of other users.  The music 
licensing arrangement examined in Broadcast Music (1979) constitutes a less extreme example.  
The Supreme Court suggested that parties to the licensing arrangement collectively contribute 
complementary “raw material” (songs) without which each party would be “inherently unable to 
compete fully effectively” (pp. 22-23).  Similarly, teams can be understood as contributors of 
complementary inputs when it comes down to the “production” of games.
30  Consumers perceive 
value to having at least two teams in a network and may perceive greater value to having more, if 
not unboundedly more, teams in the network. 
 
The appeal to demand-side network effects alone provides a rationale for suggesting that teams 
constitute complements rather than “actual or potential competitors,” but it does not provide a 
rationale for assembling them in governance structures called “leagues.”  Not belonging to a 
league does not, of itself, preclude parties from independently organizing teams and producing 
“games” (Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum [1984] at 1390).  Note, however, what the court in 
Chicago Professional Sports slips in to the analysis when it makes reference not to the 
production of generic “professional basketball games” but to the production of “‘NBA 
Basketball’ games” (pg. 599).  The court is implying that the entity governing the league (the 
NBA) contributes complementary inputs to the production of games.  Among other things, the 
league contributes its “NBA” brand to the marketing of games.  Leagues also contribute to the 
production of league-branded games by imposing standards in rule-making and by organizing 
competition, including “playoff” competition, between member teams.
31 
                                                 
29 Fraser (2002) is an exception in that the court also enumerated aspects of the governance of Major League Soccer 
that might enable it to secure single entity status on the basis of economic unity (Fraser pg 56). 
30 See, for example, Fraser (2002) at 56, Chicago Professional Sports (1996) at 599, William H. Sullivan II v. 
National Football League (1994) 34 F.3d 1091 at 1102, Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum (1984) at 1390, North 
American Soccer League v. National Football League (1982) 459 U.S. 1074 at 1077 and (1980) 505 F. Supp. 659 at 
676 and 687, John Mackey et al. v. National Football League et al. (1976) 543 F.2d 606 at 619, and Seals (1974) at 
969-970. 
31 Note, for example, diseconomies that lack of standards and lack of organized “playoffs” may achieve in contexts 
such as professional boxing.  A surprising array of entities govern professional boxing, but the four preeminent        
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League-sanctioned standards and the promotion of league-sanctioned competition enable 
constituent teams to achieve economies analogous to supply-side network effects.  These 
economies provide a rationale for forming a league and for suggesting that league governance is 
designed not to police a cartel of “actual or potential competitors” but to promote the 
commercialization of league-branded products.  Supply-side network effects suggest a way of 
interpreting league-imposed restraints: the restraints are “vertical,” rather than “horizontal,” 
insofar as the league is contributing complementary inputs.  Note, however, that NCAA v. Board 
of Regents (1984) 468 U.S. 85 confuses the role vertical restraints with horizontal restraints when 
it states “[W]hat is critical is that this case involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on 
competition are essential if the product is to be available at all” (pg. 101).  If the inputs are 
“critical” (thus, complementary) in the production of the “product,” then the restraints are 
vertical, not horizontal, which is the same thing as saying that parties are contributing 
complementary inputs. 
 
While courts have suggested that sports leagues could secure single entity status on the basis of 
complementarity, they have sometimes rejected single entity defenses in contexts in which they 
have acknowledged that teams constitute complementary inputs.  The key point is that courts 
have effectively judged teams to be “actual or potential competitors” in some markets if not in all 
markets.  Complementarity might enable leagues to secure single entity status when it comes to 
the production of league-branded games, but courts have sometimes accepted market definitions 
under which teams could be understood as “actual or potential competitors.”  Most notably 
single entity defenses have failed in contexts involving competition between teams in labor 
markets – that is, in markets for players and coaches (e.g., Smith 1979, Mackey 1976).  The 
professional soccer league Major League Soccer has had some success thwarting challenges 
under Section 1 of the Sherman to teams’ hiring practices by explicitly organizing teams within a 
tightly structured “single entity.”  In Fraser (2002), the district court dismissed plaintiffs’ 
Section 1 challenge on summary judgment by effectively accepting the single entity status of the 
league on the basis of economic unity (Fraser [2002] at 55).  Since economic unity trumps 
considerations of complementarity, the court did not bother proceed to the second-stage test of 
“actual or potential competitors.” 
 
The structure of Major League Soccer would arguably satisfy Criteria 1 through 6 for economic 
unity.  The league owns the teams in the league, delegates management to the parties who 
formed the league, and reserves all control rights.  Even so, the court of appeals in Fraser was 
reluctant to extend single entity status to the league given the fact that the parties who formed the 
league operated much like team owners but also participated in the governance of the league.  
The court suggest that “the analogy to a single entity is weakened, and the resemblance to a 
collaborative venture strengthened, by the fact that the operator/investors are not mere servants 
of [Major League Soccer]; effectively, they control it, having the majority of votes on the 
managing board” (pg. 57).  What the Fraser court declined to do, however, was suggest how 
board participation informs “control.”  Interestingly, however, the court effectively implied that 
board participation diminishes rather than strengthens the appeal to single entity status on the 
basis of economic unity. 
                                                                                                                                                             
entities seem to be the World Boxing Association, the International Boxing Federation, the World Boxing Council, 




5.2  Exclusive service contracts 
 
The court of appeals in Tafford E. Oltz v. St. Peter’s Community Hospital (1988) 861 F.2d 1440 
implied that anesthesia services complemented surgeries conducted at the hospital
32 but then 
turned around and implied that anesthesia did not complement surgeries.  The court then 
proceeded to reject the single entity defense that St. Peter’s and a group of anesthesiologists 
advanced.  The courts reasoning seemed to contemplate a market defined as “stand-alone 
anesthesia services”
33 as opposed to, say, “anesthesia services provided in support surgeries 
conducted in hospital operating rooms.”  Note that the court’s market would include “morphine 
sold and administered on street corners” – which is to say that the court’s market definition 
precludes consideration of the prospect that anesthesia services complement surgeries. 
 
St. Peter’s had a contract with Tafford Oltz for anesthesia services.  The contract would renew 
each month until either party opted to exit the relationship. The hospital also contracted with a 
number of MD anesthesiologists.  St. Peter’s changed its contracting by soliciting an exclusive 
contract for anesthesia services.  Three of the four MD anesthesiologists who worked at St 
Peter’s formed a group and secured the exclusive contract.  St. Peter’s proceeded to exercise its 
right to terminate the contract with Oltz. 
 
Oltz sued, claiming that the hospital and MD anesthesiologists group conspired in a manner 
actionable under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  The hospital trotted out a single entity defense.  
The court rejected the defense on the grounds that the anesthesiologists’ group and the hospital 
were not effectively integrated, and the court proceeded to rule in favor of Oltz. 
 
The court effectively applied the test of economic unity to the exclusive contract and proceeded 
to reject the single entity defense,  The court neglected to apply the “actual or potential 
competitors test” that might have allowed it to accept single entity status on the basis of 
complementarity.  The important point is that the court accepted a market definition that 
precluded consideration of complementarity.  In turn, it effectively judged that the 
anesthesiologists themselves constituted “actual or potential competitors” and that the exclusive 
contract constituted a horizontal restraint on the provision of anesthesia services. 
 
Arguably, the exclusive contract between the anesthesiology group and the hospital fails Criteria 
1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 and only satisfies Criterion 6.  The anesthesiologists contribute important assets 
such as anesthesiology “know how” and credentials to the production of surgeries supported by 
anesthesia services.  The hospital contributes intangible assets such as surgical “know how” as 
well as physical assets such as operating facilities.  It is not obvious that either party reserves 
control rights with respect to the assets owned by the other party.  Thus, the contractual 
arrangement appears to join to distinct nexuses of control.  The fact that these two nexuses are 
                                                 
32 “St. Peter's enjoyed the overwhelming majority of the market for general surgery [in Helena, Montana].   As a 
result, an anesthesia service provider desiring to serve that market had to work at St. Peter's” (pp. 1446-1447).  That 
is, demand for anesthesia services derives from demand for surgeries.  Anesthesia services complement surgeries! 
33 “[The court] conclude[s] that anesthesia services and the Helena [Montana] area framed the appropriate product 
and geographic components of a relevant market in which the jury could assess injury to competition” (pg. 1447).        
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distinct provides a rationale for suggesting that they each represent independent centers of 
decision-making.  Were one to then reject single entity status on the basis of economic unity, one 
could proceed to the “actual or potential competitors” test, which constitutes a de facto rule-of-
reason analysis of the harm and efficiencies (if any) the exclusive contract induces.  The court 
itself proceeded to a de jure rule-of-reason analysis under which it accepted a particular market 
definition.  The market definition lent itself to a characterization of harm to competition but not 
to a characterization of efficiencies that might outweigh the perceived harm. 
 
I suggest that the market definition the court used, “anesthesia services” in Helena Montana, is 
problematic and should have been replaced with a definition such as “anesthesia performed in 
support of surgeries conducted in Helena Montana.”  The alternative market definition lends 
itself to a finding that the hospital and anesthesiologists contribute complementary inputs.  While 
the court might yet have declined to accept the parties single entity defense, the court would have 
had to amend its characterization of harm and efficiencies and would have provided itself a 
rationale for overturning the district court’s orders.  
 
 
5.3 Licensing  contracts 
 
Intellectual properties, such as patents and trademarks, constitute good examples of bottleneck 
assets in that anyone seeking to commercialize a patent or a trademark must either own the asset 
or secure a license to deploy the asset.  Bottleneck status, however, does not imply value.  
Anyone could register the trademark “Victoria” (indicating the Roman goddess of victory), 
license the trademark to a shoe manufacturer and sell athletic shoes in competition with brands 
like Nike (named after the Greek goddess of victory).  Without investing heavily in the 
marketing of the Victoria brand, it is not obvious that any Victoria-brand shoes would be sold or 
even that any manufacturer would seek a license to produce them.  Valuable or not, the case law 
provides a basis for suggesting that the combination of a trademark owner and a manufacturer in 
a licensing agreements could secure the status of a single entity. The parties might not secure 
single entity status on the basis of economic unity.  Indeed, if both parties are contributing assets 
to the production of Victoria-brand shoes, then it is not obvious that the licensing agreement 
would not fail at least five of the six benchmark criteria for economic unity.  Even so, the parties 
might secure single entity status for the narrow purpose of analyzing competition in markets for 
athletic shoes on the basis of complementarity.  Similarly, patents may or may not be valuable, 
but a patent holder and licensee could conceivably secure single entity status on the basis of 
complementarity. 
 
The court has accepted single entity status of parties joined in an exclusive patent license in Levi 
Case Company (1992).  The court observed that the licensee did not maintain “independent 
decisionmaking authority regarding the exploitation of the patent” (pg. 432).  This is an oblique 
way of indicating that the patent holder already maintained a monopoly over a bottleneck input 
(rights-of-way) to the commercialization of the patent.  The licensee reserved no control rights 
with respect to the patent but rights-of-way constituted a complement to the licensee’s inputs 
(manufacturing capabilities).   
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While a single entity defense might neutralize challenges to exclusive contracting mounted under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, one can imagine finessing the single entity defense by mounting a 
“monopolization” challenge under Section 2.  Alternatively, one might challenge a single entity 
defense directly by suggesting that while the parties to the licensing agreement might be 
contributing inputs that are complementary to the commercialization of the patent, the licensing 
agreement were designed to insulate the bottleneck from competition from, say, the licensee 
itself.  The licensee may, for example, have been developing substitute technologies, in which 
case one might deem the licensee and the patent holder as “actual or potential competitors” not in 





Since at least the 1930’s, economists have puzzled over how to delineate the boundaries of the 
firm, and, indeed, “the boundaries of the firm” remains an active topic of research to this day.  
Since the advent of antitrust legislation, courts have been pressed to consider what should 
constitute “conspiracies.”  Courts have sometimes characterized conspiracies by negation – by 
sorting out what they are not – specifically, by extending the status of “single entity” to certain 
types of business arrangements that join otherwise independent corporate entities.   
 
Both efforts in economics to sort out what constitutes a “firm” and efforts in the law to sort out 
what constitutes a “single entity” have focused on “control.”  A difficulty is that neither the law 
nor economics – nor any other field – offer a concept of control that can enable analysis.  Just 
posing hierarchical relationships, for example, between “bosses” and “employees” or between 
“parent companies” and “subsidiaries” offers little guidance.  There is nothing about the 
relationship per se that suggests that one party can induce some other party to undertake some 
type of costly activity.  Thus “control” has remained nothing more than an intuitively appealing 
idea.  It has never been an operationally significant idea. 
 
Fortunately, more recent developments in both economics and the single entity case law provide 
provide concepts other than control that provide ways of understanding economic organization.  
Economics provides concepts such as adaptation and control rights that together motivate why 
control matters at all. The appeal to control rights also provides a way of understanding how 
ownership and control are related.  At the same time, the law contributes a concept of delegation 
that allows one to distinguish day-to-day management from control.  Finally, problems of 
economic adaptation suggest a role for renegotiation in the governance of economic relations.  
Renegotiation itself provides ways of distinguishing how parties allocate control rights in 
organizations.  Knowing how parties allocate control rights can help analysts evaluate single 
entity defenses. 
 
These four concepts – adaptation, control rights, delegation, and renegotiation – provide a way of 
operationalizing benchmarks against which to measure the degree to which parties exhibit 
economic unity in organizations.  Economic unity constitutes the basis for an array of single 
entity tests proposed in the case law.  But the law goes further. It sometimes finesses the full-
blown analysis of harm and efficiencies that a rule-of-reason analysis would demand by        
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extending single entity status to parties that contribute complementary assets, complementary 
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When would the court accept or reject a single entity defense? 
 
 
          
 
 
The first test sorts out whether or not control rights within the candidate single entity are 
concentrated.  Evidence that control rights are concentrated allows the court to accept the single 
entity defense.  Evidence that control rights are fragmented (not concentrated) advances 
decision-making to a second test.  The second test sorts out whether not parties to the candidate 
single entity contribute complementary inputs.  If they contribute complementary inputs, the 
court will be disposed to accept the single entity defense.  Absence of complementarity leaves 
the court with the conclusion that the parties are “actual or potential competitors,” and the court 
will reject the single entity defense. 
 
The candidate single entity satisfies 
the test of economic unity? 
The parties contribute 
complementary inputs? 
Yes  No 
Yes No  ACCEPT 











Circled items constitute nexuses of control.  
Thus, party A constitutes one nexus and 
parties A and B together constitute a second 
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